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RECENT DECISIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-INDICTMENT-VIOLATION

PENNSYLVANIA

ANTHRACITE

OF

MINE LAW

NOT INDICTABLE OFFENSE.

Commonwealth v. Cano (Pa. Super. 1956).
Defendants were arrested and brought to trial under a bench warrant
issued pursuant to an information filed by an anthracite mine inspector 1
following an accident at their mine in which five miners were killed. A
requested jury trial resulted in defendants' being convicted on four counts
of negligently violating the Anthracite Mine Law. 2 They were sentenced
to the maximum penalty of three months in prison and fined five hundred
dollars on each count for a total punishment of one year in prison and a fine
of two thousand dollars. Defendants prosecuted this appeal alleging violation of the Constitution of Pennsylvania 3 in that they had not been indicted
by a grand jury. The Superior Court held that their offenses were not
indictable and that they were properly proceeded against by information.
Commonwealth v. Cano, 128 A. 2d 328 (Pa. Super. 1956).4
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that no one may be pro5
ceeded against criminally by information for any indictable offense. An
indictment is the only process whereby an accused can be brought to trial
for an indictable offense." This prohibition against the use of the information for an indictable offense refers to informations as understood in English
law prior to 1790, and is not intended to proscribe the information pro1. PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 511 (Supp. 1956). "Any judge of... quarter sessions
.is hereby authorized and required, upon presentation to him of the affidavit of any
citizen. . .setting forth that the owner..., had been negligently guilty of an offense

against the provisions of this act, whereby a dangerous accident had resulted.

.

., to

issue a warrant..., directing such persons to be arrested and brought before said
judge.....

2. Ibid.
3. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10. The defendants alleged other grounds as error but the

scope of this recent decision is limited to a consideration of the constitutional question.
4. Commonwealth v. Cano, 128 A.2d 358 (Pa. Super. 1956).
5. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10: "No person, shall, for any indictable offense, be pro"
ceeded against criminally by information ..
6. Commonwealth v. Wadley, 169 Pa. Super. 490, 83 A.2d 417 (1951).

(408)
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cedure completely. 7 There are various tests used to determine what constitutes an indictable offense in the several jurisdictions having similar
constitutional provisions. 8 In Pennsylvania whether the offense committed
was indictable at common law seems to constitute the only test as to whether
the Commonwealth must indict." The fact that the legislature has categorized an offense as a misdemeanor is not controlling even though that
word may be construed to include all offenses below the grade of felony. 10
All offenses which especially affect public society, that is, affect the public
peace, morals, or economy are indictable at common law." This is the
test used in the instant case. Since it is the exclusive test, the result is
that if a crime defined by statute is found not to have been a common-law
crime it is not "indictable," for it fails on the first requirement.
The instant decision is vulnerable on two grounds. The precedents
cited by the court, to define the test of an indictable offense, are cases
wherein the Commonwealth sought to punish persons for behavior which
was not proscribed by statute. 12 Cases where the issue involved is whether
the offenses tried were crimes at common law and for which the violators
have been indicted hardly qualify as precedents for ascertaining what was
an indictable offense at common law, since at common law all crimes were
not indictable though punishable.' 3 The severity of the sanction imposed
is another ground for criticism. One year in the county prison and a $2,000
fine is severe punishment for violating a statute through negligence.
Characterizing the punishment as simple imprisonment in the county jail
in no way lessens its severity. Any offender who can be punished this
severely should have the protection of an indictment in the spirit of the
common law and the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Anthony L. V. Picciotti
7. Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, 333 Pa. 242, A.2d 804 (1938)
Commonwealth ex rel. Stanton v. Francies, 250 Pa. 496, 95 Atl. 527 (1915) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Scassera v. Maroney, 179 Pa. Super. 150, 115 A.2d 912 (1955).
8. U.S. CONST. amend V, Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) (depends on
punishment imposed) ; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 8, People v. Russell, 245 Ill. 268, 91 N.E.
1075 (1910) (indictment necessary if imprisonment is in penitentiary) ; Ky. CONST.
§ 12, Perry v. Bingham, 265 Ky. 133, 95 S.W.2d 1099 (1936) (depends on punishment
imposed) ; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 8, Board of Health v. New York Cent. R.R., 10 N.J.
294, 90 A.2d 729 (1952) (indictable if indictable at common law).
9. Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881); Commonwealth v. Mochan, 177
Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 (1955); Commonwealth v. DeGrange, 97 Pa. Super. 181
(1929).
10. Allen v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. Super. 244 (1921). See also Commonwealth
v. Mecca Cooperative Co., 60 Pa. Super. 314 (1914).
11. Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881) ; Commonwealth v. Hartung, 156
Pa. Super. 176, 39 A.2d 734 (1944) ; Commonwealth v. Weiner, 49 Dauph. 428 (Pa.
County Ct. 1941).
(election fraud) ; Common12. Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881)
wealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 (1955) (solicitation to commit
adultery) ; Commonwealth v. DeGrange, 97 Pa. Super. 181 (1929) (indecent assault)
Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 25 Pa. Super. 490 (1904) (attempt to commit larceny).
13. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900) ; 4
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Acuff v. Schmit (Iowa 1956).
As a result of the defendant's alleged negligence the plaintiff's husband
was permanently incapacitated in an automobile accident. Plaintiff brought
this action for damages for loss of consortium, including loss of sexual
relations, with her husband arising out of such alleged negligence. The
trial court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that
the petition failed to state a cause of action. In a case of first impression,
the Supreme Court of Iowa held (5-4) that a wife's petition for damages
for loss of consortium against one who by his negligence had permanently
incapacitated her husband stated a cause of action. Acuff v. Schmitt, 78
N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1956). 1
At common law husband and wife were one; the husband had complete
dominion over all his wife's property and the wife had no standing to bring
an action at law.2 Thus, consortium at common law included the conjugal
fellowship of husband and wife and also, as the dominant factor, the husband's right to the services of the wife which contributed and assisted in
all the relations of domestic life.8 This material version of consortium was
modified into the so-called sentimental version in which the courts placed
less emphasis on the element of services and defined consortium to be the
right of each spouse to the company, cooperation, affection and aid of the
other in every conjugal relation. 4 After the "married women's acts" were
passed, the wife became a legal person, distinct from her husband, with the
right to own property and to bring actions at law or in equity without
joining her husband as a necessary party.5 In interpreting these statutes
a majority of courts have granted the wife the right to recover damages
for loss of consortium for intentional invasions of her interests, such as
alienation of affections, 6 and criminal conversation. 7 Some courts deny
the wife the right to bring such an action.8 Although recent litigation on
1. Acuff v. Schmit, 78 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1956).
2. 1 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *442.

3. Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
4. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
5. Harmon v. Old Colony Ry., 165 Mass. 100, 42 N.E. 5,05 (1896).
6. Parker v. Newman, 200 Ala. 103, 75 So. 479 (1917)
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 34
Del. (4 Harr.) 576, 156 Atl. 354 (1931).
7. Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S.W. 23 (1918); Oppenheim v. Kridel,
236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
8. Kroessin v. Keller, 60 Minn. 372, 62 N.W. 438 (1895) ; Duffies v. Duffies, 76
Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890).
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the point has been sparse, it has generally been held that a husband can
recover for loss of consortium where the wife's injury is negligently inflicted, notwithstanding the "married women's acts." 9 However, the vast
majority of jurisdictions hold that the wife cannot recover in the same
situation, i.e., where the husband is injured due to a third person's negligence. 10 One reason for this position is that the wife's loss is only indirect
and the husband's injury did not amount to a violation of her personal
rights." Another reason given is that the "married women's acts" enabled
the wife to sue only to protect the rights she already had but did not give
her any new rights. Since she had no right to recover for the loss of
consortium at common law, she still has no such right. 12 The wife has
been denied a cause of action also on the ground that she has no legal
claim to the actual services of her husband and her only right is to have his
support. As the husband recovers damages for this in his action, to allow
the wife to recover would be to allow a double recovery for the same
wrong. 13

Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,'

4

is the leading case granting a wife

a cause of action for loss of consortium due to negligent injury to her
husband. The holding in that case was based on the theory that "the
husband and wife have equal rights in the marriage relation which [should]
receive equal protection of the law." 15
The court in the instant case, recognizing the vast weight of contrary
authority and the almost total lack of precedent for allowing the plaintiff's
cause of action, has, nevertheless, adopted the reasoning of the Hitaffer
case. It is interesting to note that the court has adopted this minority
view despite the fact that there are no previous Iowa cases specifically
establishing a cause of action for loss of consortium in favor of the husband.' 6 However, in the light of present day standards and ideals the
court has reached the most desirable result. There is no compelling reason
for giving the wife any fewer rights as a result of the marriage than are
9. People's Home Telephone Co., v. Cockrum, 182 Ala. 547, 62 So. 86 (1913);

Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kinman, 182 Ky. 597, 206 S.W. 880 (1918); Riley v. Lidtke,

49 Neb. 139, 68 N.W. 356 (1896) ; Kelley v. Mayberry Twp., 154 Pa. 440, 26 Atl. 595
(1893); Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 192 S.C. 230, 13 S.E.2d 1 (1941). Contra,
Marri v. Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911) ; Gearing v. Berkson, 223
Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916) ; Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187, 236 N.W. 222
(1931) ; Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
10. Josewski v. Midland Construction Inc., 117 F. Supp. 681 (D. S.D. 1953);
Johnson v. Enlow, 286 P.2d 630 (Colo. 1955) ; Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8
N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
11. Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937)
Gambino v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158 S.W. 77 (1913).
12. Cravens v. Louisville & N.R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922) ; Nash v.

Mobile & O.R.R., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928).
13. Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1919).
14. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
15. Id. at 816.
16. Acuff v. Schmit, 78 N.W. 2d 480, 489 (Iowa 1956) (dissenting opinion).
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given to the husband, especially since the equality of the spouses is now
recognized by the law. The injury suffered by a wife from loss of consortium with her husband is the same injury suffered by a husband who
seeks damages for loss of consortium with his wife. Since the husband
can recover for the loss of consortium as a result of the wife's negligent
injury it is unreasonable to deny such recovery to the wife. Certainly
to allow her to recover will not be allowing double recovery as the wife
is not recovering for any injury done to her husband, but is recovering for
an injury done to her, i.e., the loss of the company, aid and affection of
her husband.
FrancisP. Connors

INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILE

LIABILITY

POLICIES-COOPERATION

CLAUSE.

American Surety Co. v. Diamond (N.Y. 1956).
Adolph Diamond was fatally injured in a collision while riding as a
passenger in his son David's automobile being driven by Adolph's wife
Fannie Diamond, with his son's consent. David Diamond had purchased
an automobile liability insurance policy under which the American Surety
Company agreed to insure not only the owner but any authorized driver
of the assured's auto. As executrix of her husband's will, Fannie Diamond
initiated a wrongful death action against the named insured David Diamond.
The attorney provided by the insurer to represent the insured prepared an
answer which the insured verified. However, when the attorney tendered
to the insured a third-party complaint to bring into the action Fannie Diamond, individually, as driver of the car, the insured refused to verify this
pleading.' The insurer, contending that this was a breach of the clause of the
policy requiring the insured to cooperate with the company in the conduct
of suits, declared the policy forfeited, and brought this action praying for
a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to defend the death action
or to pay any judgment rendered against David Diamond therein. On
appeal, the judgment of the lower court in favor of the insurer was reversed,
and the court of appeals in a 4-3 decision held, inter alia, that the insured
was not required, under the court's interpretation of the words of thc
policy, to cooperate in the cross suit until the insurer acquired rights under
1. Defendant must serve a verified complaint to bring in a person who is or may
be liable to him. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 193-a. The assured did, however, offer to
submit the controversy to the Appellate Division on an agreed statement of facts. N.Y.

Civ. PiAc. Acr. § 546.
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the subrogation clause by making payments. American Surety Co. v.
Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876 (1956).2
Cooperation clauses have long been used in policies of insurance to
3
prevent collusion between the insured and the injured party. They also
enable the insurer to compel the often indispensable aid of the insured in
4
determining whether or not to settle the claim. Cooperation is a condition
5
of the policy, not a mere covenant. Only if the insured's lack of coopera6
tion is substantial and material is there a breach of the condition. Lack
of prejudice to the insurer is not conclusive evidence of the immateriality
7
of the failure to cooperate but only an indication of it. Courts have given
various meanings to the word "cooperate," 8 but so far as appears none
has had to deal with insured's failure to verify a third-party complaint under
a cooperation clause. Fraud or collusion clearly may be the basis for
finding a lack of cooperation, 9 but lack of good faith (and, a fortiori, fraud)
is not to be inferred merely because there is some relationship between the
injured party and the insured. 10 In Wheeler v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co., the court, after citing Justice Cardozo's definition of cooperation,"
said:
"All the authorities agree that 'cooperation' referred to in these
policies carries the meaning that the assured shall give the insurer a
full, fair, and frank disclosure of all information reasonably requested
by the insurer, shall aid in defense of the suit and testify truthfully
when called as a witness, and refrain from any collusion with the
injured party, and from fraud." 12
One text writer has said, "Lack of cooperation is a broad term, which may
include fraud or collusion, but may also mean merely the refusal of the
2. American Surety Co. v. Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876 (1956).
3. See Kindervater v. Motorists Cas. Ins. Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 199 Ati. 606 (198).
4. See Schneider v. Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Ill. 137, 178 N.E. 466 (1931).
5. Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).
6. Curran v. Connecticut Indemnity Co., 127 Conn. 692, 20 A.2d 87 (1941).
7. Curran v. Connecticut Indemnity Co., supra note 6; Glens Falls Indemnity Co.
v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 261, 187 Atl. 473, 477 (1936).
8. American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Mack, 34 F.Supp. 224 (E.D. Ky. 1940)
Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).
9. Bradford v. Commonwealth Cas. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 301, 158 Atl. 840 (1932).
10. Cf. Conroy v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 292 Pa. 219, 140 Atl. 905 (1928).
But see Ohio Cas. Co. v. Swan, 89 F.2d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1937).
11. "Cooperation does not mean that the assured is to combine with the insurer
to present a sham defense. Cooperation does mean that there shall be a fair and frank
disclosure of information reasonably demanded by the insurer to enable it to determine
whether there is a genuine defense." Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y.
271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928) _(refusal to give information).
12. 5 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Me. 1933) (false statements innocently made).
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insured to do a positive act." 13 However, he does not cite any cases
dealing with a failure to verify third-party complaints or pleadings
14
generally.
It is clear that David Diamond would have a right to indemnification
against his mother as negligent operator of the automobile. 15 The insurer
claimed the benefit of this right, asserting that it could avoid the terms of
the policy covering the operator because this policy did not specifically insure against interspouse suits.'0 The court implies that if the policy had
specifically required the insured to verify cross-complaints the insurer would
have had a right to cross complain against the negligent driver in these
circumstances. The language of the cooperation clause that the "...
insured . . . shall assist . . . in the conduct of suits" 17 is broad
enough, if liberally construed, to require the insured to verify a third-party
complaint. However, the subrogation clause s rather clearly limits this
requirement to assistance over against others only after payment to the
insured by the insurer. The majority based their decision on two grounds.
The first was the traditional meaning of "cooperation" in these insurance
policies, and the rule that ambiguous language in an insurance contract
should be most strongly construed against the insurer. 19 The second was
the fact that David's actions did not constitute willful obstruction of the
insurer's rights. The common view is that cooperation means that the
insured shall aid in the defense of a suit,20 and a third-party complaint
bringing in an additional party appears to be more of an offensive than a
defensive device. 21 The decision of the court is well grounded, but it
would have been interesting, if the court had allowed the third-party
complaint by exercising its discretionary powers and giving a liberal interpretation to the cooperation clause, to observe how it would have decided
when directly confronted with the issue of whether this would constitute
13. 8 APPLtMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4771 (1942).
14. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bonacci, 111 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.
1940) (contradictory statements) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wyer, 60
F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1932) (insured did not admit driving the car); Wheeler v.
Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 5 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Me. 1933) (false statements innocently made); Medico v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 132 Me. 422, 172 Ati. 1
(inconsistent statements innocently made) ; Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas.
1934)
o., 2 47 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928) (refusal to testify).
15. Dittmon v. Davis, 274 App. Div. 836, 80 N.Y.S.2d 737 (3d Dep't 1948).
16. N.Y. INs. LAW § 167 (3). "No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure
against any liability of an insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse
or because of injury to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse unless express
provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy." See Kuhn v. Auto Cab
Mut. Indemnity Co., 244 App. Div. 272, 279 N.Y. Supp. 60 (2d Dep't 1935).
17. American Surety Co. v. Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1956).
18. American Surety Co. v. Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1956).
19. Janneck v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 N.Y. 574, 57 N.E. 182 (1900).
20. Wheeler v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 5 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Me. 1933).
21. For the nature of a cross complaint, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 676-79 (2d
ed. 1947) ; and for impleading, id at 408-19 (2d ed. 1947).
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an interspouse suit as prohibited by New York statute.2 2 It is submitted
that if the court were to allow the cross complaint against David's mother,
it would be permitting an interspouse suit indirectly which could not be
done directly.
William J. Goebelbecker.

LABOR

LAW-NON-COMMUNIST

AFFIDAVIT-AUTHORITY OF

NLRB

TO

DECLARE DECOMPLIANCE FOR FALSE FILING.

Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers (U.S. 1956).
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. NLRB (U.S. 1956).
In the first of two companion cases, the International Union of Mine
Workers filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) charging the Precision Scientific Co. with a refusal to bargain
with it in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 1 The
company's answer challenged the union's compliance status under section
9(h) of the NLRA 2 alleging that the non-communist affidavit filed by
one of the union's officers was false. The Board, finding in a separate
hearing that the affidavit was false, declared that the union could not seek
the benefits of the NLRA since it was not in compliance with section 9(h).
The union's suit to have this order enjoined was denied by the district
court, but this decision was reversed by the court of appeals. Certiorari
having been granted, the Supreme Court held that the NLRB has no
authority to deprive a union of its compliance status because of the filing
of a false affidavit. Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 77
Sup. Ct. 154 (1956).3 Much the same question was presented by the
companion case. Here the union charged the Lannom Manufacturing Co.
with an unfair labor practice 4 and the Board issued a cease and desist
22. N.Y. INS. LAw § 167 (3). The court states by way of dictum that, "... David
Diamond's liability, if any, to his father's executors was certainly not that of one
spouse to another." American Surety Co. v. Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876,

888 (1956).
1.LMRA § 8(a)(5), 61 STAT. 140, 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (1952),
which amended the NLRA, 49 STAT. 449, 29 U.S.C. 151-188 (1952). "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ... "
2. "No investigation shall be made by the board . . . unless there is on file with
the Board an affidavit executed . . . by each officer . . . that he is not a member of

the Communist party. .

.

. The provisions of section 35A of the Criminal Code shall

be applicable in respect to such affidavits." LMRA § 9(h), 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29

U.S.C. 159(h) (1952).
3. Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 77 Sup. Ct. 154 (1956).
4. LMRA § 8(a) (1), 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1) (1952). "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with . . . employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." The pertinent part of section 7 states:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization ...
"
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order. 5 Subsequently an officer of the union was convicted of filing a
false affidavit in re section 9(h). Consequently, the Board declared the
union out of compliance. The union had this order enjoined., Pending an
appeal of this injunction order the Board sought to have its original order
against Lannom enforced, and Lannom's defense that the Board did not
have the authority to issue the order because the union was not in compliance prevailed in the court of appeals. On certiorari, the Supreme Court
held, as in the Leedom case, that section 9(h) requires only filing and that
the veracity of the affidavit is not open to question since the only sanction
authorized by the act is a criminal proceeding against the affiant. Anial7
gamaited Meat Cutters v. NLRB, 77 Sup. Ct. 159 (1956).
Section 9(h) was added to the NLRA in 1947 by the Labor Management Relations Act of that year.8 There had been no similar provision.
Section 9(h) was held constitutional in 1950.9 It provides that before a
union can seek any of the benefits provided by the act all of its officers
must file non-communist affidavits. In terms, the only sanction it imposes
for a false affidavit is a criminal proceeding against an individual affiant
under section 35A of the Criminal Code. 10 The Board's original policy
in granting compliance status was to accept as sufficient the mere filing
of these affidavits without investigating their veracity. Nor would the
Board allow an employer to raise the question." But, in 1953 the NLRB
promulgated a new tatement of policy to the effect that whenever a union
officer was under indictment for perjury in connection with his affidavit
filed under this section, any proceeding instituted by that union would be
stayed since "a judicial determination . . . will of course have a direct
impact upon the compliance status of the labor organization involved." 12
The Supreme Court suggests in the Leedom case that this policy was
based on judicial declarations to the effect that the Board has the
authority to protect its process from abuse. 13 The court of appeals, in
5. Lannom Manufacturing Co. & International Fur Workers Union, 103 N.L.R.B.
847 (1953). The order issued was to cease and desist from discouraging membership
in the union.
6. Farmer v. International Fur Workers Union, 221 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
International subsequently merged with Amalgamated in February of 1955.
7. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. NLRB, 77 Sup. Ct. 159 (1956).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
10. Section 35A of the Criminal Code was repealed, 62 STAT. 862 (1948), and is
now covered by sections 286, 287, 1001, 1022 and 1023 of TITLE 18, U.S.C. "Whoever ... knowingly and willfully falsifies ... statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing knowingly . . . shall be fined .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
11. NLRB v. Sharples Chemicals Inc., 209 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Farmer
v. United Electrical Workers, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943
(1954); Sunbeam Corp., 93 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1951); Matter of Craddock-Terry Shoe
Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 842 (1948).
12. 18 FED. REc. 7185 (1953).
13. NLRB v. Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 180 F.2d 68, 71 (10th Cir. 1950),
NLRB v. Indiana and Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1943).
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affirming the Board's action in the Amalgamated case, assumed that a false
14
affidavit was not an "affidavit" within the meaning of section 9(h).
Such a holding is equally applicable to other data required to be filed by
the act.15
The decisions in the instant cases are based on the words of section
9(h) and its legislative history. The original bills proposed in the House
and the Senate would have given the Board the authority to investigate
the veracity of all affidavits filed with it."e These bills were amended
because Congress felt that such investigations would be too time-consuming. 17 The Amalgamated case presents a situation in which there would
have been no undue consumption of time because the affidavit had been
found false previously and independently.1 8 But a plain reading of the
section indicates no authority in the Board to investigate even affidavits
such as these. Since Congress, when it wished to give the Board extensive
authority, did so in clear language, 19 the instant decisions seem clearly
correct. This is especially true since Congress has also enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act, providing in part that no sanction not
2°
delegated to an agency may be imposed by it,
and has also created a
Subversive Activities Control Board which can remove a union from the
scope of the NLRB upon a proper finding. 21 Moreover, as one court
pointed out, were the Board to have the authority it asserted in the instant
cases, a union which had unwittingly elected a communist to office might
22
find itself deprived of the very considerable advantages of the NLRA.
14. NLRB v. Lannom Mfg. Co., 226 F.2d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1955).
15. NLRB v. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Co., 214 F.2d 369 .(5th Cir.), cert. denied,

348 U.S. 873 (1954)

(financial data).

16. 1 LnG. HIST., LABOR MANAGEMSNT RELATIONS Acr, 190, 251 (1947),

and

2 id. at 1434-1435, cited by the court in Leedom v. International Mine Workers, 77
Sup. Ct. 154, 157 (1956).
17. 93 CONG. Ezc. 6860 (1947).
18. The affidavit found false was filed in 1950. The Board's action was based
on an affidavit filed in 1951. Both the Board and the court of appeals held that the
falsity in the 1950 affidavit raised a presumption, which was not rebutted, that the
succeeding affidavit was also false. Judge Stewart, dissenting in the court of appeals
(see note 14 supra), and Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Supreme Court (see
note 7 supra), would hold that no such presumption arises.
19. See, e.g., LMRA § 10(a), (b), and (c), 61

STAT.

140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160

(a), (b), (c)(1952).
20. Administrative Procedure Act § 9(a), 60 STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 1008
(1952).
21. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 987, 50 U.S.C. 782-786, as
amended by the Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 775, 50 U.S.C.A. 782, 784,
785, 789, 790-793, 841-844 (Supp. 1956). "When there is in effect a final order of the
Board determining that any such labor organization is a communist-action organization ..... such organization shall be ineligible to . . . (take part in any NLRB proceedings), 68 STAT. 779-780, 50 U.S.C.A. 792(a) (h) (Supp. 1956).

22. See Farmer v. United Electrical Workers, 211 F.2d 36, 39 (D. C. Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954).
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Though it may be arguable that it would be sounder policy to grant the
Board such authority, Congress has chosen not to do so.
Joseph M. Smith

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-TEAcHER
REFUSAL

TO RESPOND

TO

LOYALTY

DISMISSAL-

INQUIRY-INOMPETENCE.

Board of Public Education v. Beilan (Pa. 1956).
The superintendent of schools, having information raising a question
of the loyalty of Herman A. Beilan, a teacher having tenure under the
Public School Code of 1949,1 asked Beilan if he was Press Director of the
Professional Section of the Communist Political Association in 1944.
Though warned that refusal to answer might lead to his dismissal, appellee
refused to answer that or similar questions. The Board of Education
conducted a formal hearing charging Beilan with "incompetency" 2 and
willful violation of the school laws.S The charges were sustained and the
appellee ordered dismissed. The court of common pleas reversed the
order and set aside the dismissal. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed (5-2), holding, that the deliberate and insubordinate
refusal to answer questions concerning his loyalty rendered Beilan incompetent within the meaning of the statute. Board of Public Education v.
4
Beilan, 125 A.2d 327 (Pa. 1956).
The teachers' tenure acts of the various states provide that after a
probationary period of service is rendered on a year to year contract basis,
the teacher's appointment becomes permanent conditioned on good behavior. 5 Generally, a "tenure" teacher may be dismissed only for a cause
enumerated in the statute, but some statutes contain the catch-all phrase
"or other good cause." 0 The most common causes enumerated are incompetence, 7 inefficiency, 8 neglect of duty,9 immorality, 10 and insubordina1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1121 (Supp. 1956).
2. There were two counts of incompetency: (1) Mr. Beilan's refusal to respond
to the superintendent's inquiry as to his loyalty and (2) his conduct in refusing, on
grounds of the fifth amendment, to respond to the inquiry as to his alleged communist
affiliations made by a congressional investigating committee.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (Supp. 1956).
4. Board of Public Education v. Beilan, 125 A.2d 327 (Pa. 1956), cert. granted, 25
U.S.L. WEEK 3224 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1957) (No. 668).
5. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 122, §24-2 (Smith-Hurd 1954) ; N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:16-37
(1937) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, 11-1121 (Supp. 1956).
6. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 71, § 42 (1951).
7. LA. Rnv. STAT. § 17:443 (Supp. 1953); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3012; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (Supp. 1956).
8. N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:16-38 (1937); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012.
9. LA. REV. STAT. § 17:443 (Supp. 1953) ; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012.
10. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (Supp. 1956).
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tion." Most tenure statutes provide for notice and hearing by the appointing authority before dismissing a teacher who has served the probationary
period.12 The Pennsylvania statute enumerates seven causes 13 for dismissal, one of which is incompetence. Incompetence has been construed
4
heretofore by the Pennsylvania courts as subject to a broad interpretation.'
Thus, it has been held that incompetence embraces not only a lack of substantive knowledge of the subjects to be taught, but also a want of physical
ability 15 as well as a loss of standing in the community resulting from
conduct outside the classroom.' 6
Refusal to answer a question which the superintendent had no right
to ask, because it did not concern Beilan's competence, would not constitute insubordination for which he could be held incompetent. Therefore, the holding in the instant case is proper only if the question concerning the appellee's loyalty was relevant to his competence as defined by
the Teachers' Tenure Act. As pointed out by the dissenting opinions, the
legislative history of the Teachers' Tenure Act indicates that such a
relevancy between disloyalty and incompetence does not exist. In 1949
the Tenure Act was amended to allow dismissal of disloyal teachers. An
inference therefrom is that until that time the legislature had not considered
disloyalty as being embraced by incompetence, since the latter was already
a cause for dismissal at the time of the amendment. 1 7 This amendment was
repealed by the Loyalty Act of 1951 18 which itself provides for dismissal
of those teachers guilty of disloyalty. At the present time a "subversive"
teacher must be proven such, under the terms of the Loyalty Act, before
he may be dismissed. The result of the instant decision is to allow dismissal of one suspected of disloyalty on the ground that his non-cooperation
relieves the appointing authority of the necessity of proving him disloyal
before dismissal.
Burchard V. Martin
11. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3012.
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 130.24 (Supp. 1954) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1127
(Supp. 1956).
13. The statute formerly included advocation of or participation in un-American
or subversive doctrines as a cause for dismissal. The Pennsylvania Loyalty Act of
1951 which now so provides, repealed this provision of the Tenure Act.
14. Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District, 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d
866 (1939).
15. West Mahoney Township School District v. Kelly, 156 Pa. Super. 601, 41
A.2d 344 (1945).
16. Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District, 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d
866 (1939) ; Appeal of Schwer, 36 Pa. D. & C. 531 (C.P., Clinton 1939).
17. Board of Public Education v. Beilan, 125 A.2d 327, 343 (Pa. 1956) (dissenting opinion), cert. granted, 25 U.S.L. WIZK 3224 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1957) (No. 668).
However, another plausible inference is that the legislature intended, by the amendment, to resolve any doubt that disloyal persons could remain as teachers in the public
school system.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 211 (Supp. 1956).
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IN TORT FOR ACTION UNENFORCEABLE

CONTRACT BECAUSE OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson (N.J. 1956).
The plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement whereby
the plaintiff, a real estate broker, was to procure a purchaser for the defendant's land. The defendant had previously granted an option to a third
party to purchase this land. However, he represented to the plaintiff that
he had the power to consummate a sale. The plaintiff procured a purchaser but the sale failed because of the outstanding option. The plaintiff
brought an action on two counts to recover a commission, the first seeking
recovery on the oral contract and the second sounding in tort for deceit.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss as to both counts.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed as to the first count because
of the requirement of the New Jersey Statute of Frauds 1 that brokers'
contracts must be in writing, but remanded the cause for reinstatement
of the second count in deceit. Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 127 A.2d
13 (N.J. 1956).2
While courts will grant restitution on a quantum ineruit basis for contracts within the Statute of Frauds,8 quantum ineruit recovery has been
consistently denied in cases involving a broker's contract in which the
broker's reliance or restitution interest is sought to be protected.4 In
Burgdorfer v. Thielnan,5 the defendant made fraudulent representations
at the time the parties entered into an oral contract which was within the
Statute of Frauds because not to be performed within one year. In allowing recovery in an action of deceit, the court said that to grant such a remedy
is not to enforce the contract but to give relief for the fraud. In the
United States many jurisdictions have adopted legislation similar to Lord
Tenterden's Act which provides:
"No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon
any representation or assurance made or given concerning or relating
to the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of any other
person, to the intent or purpose that such person may obtain credit,
1. N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 25:1-5 (Supp. 1953).
2. Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 127 A.2d 13 (N.J. 1956).
3. General Paint Corp. v. Kramer, 68 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Todd v. Bettinger, 109 Minn. 493, 124 N.W. 443 (1910).
4. Holland v. Flash, 20 Cal. App. 686, 130 Pac. 32 (1912); Weatherhead v.
Cooney, 32 Idaho 127, 180 Pac. 760 (1919); Peters v. Martin, 69 Ind. App. 436, 122
N.E. 16 (1919); Slocum v. Smith, 195 Mich. 281, 161 N.W. 830 (1917); Leimbach
v. Regner, 70 N.J.L. 608, 57 Atl. 138 (1904); Cushing v. Monarch Timber Co., 75
Wash. 678, 135 Pac. 660 (1913) ; Hale v. Kreisel, 194 Wis. 271, 215 N.W. 227 (1917).
Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 373,
3S7-94 (1936).
5. 153 Ore. 354, 55 P.2d 1123 (1936).
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money or goods upon, unless such representation or assurance be
made in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith." 6
In applying these statutes the courts have taken different positions on
whether an action for deceit will lie for representations made in orally
promising to answer for the debt of another. Some courts deny relief on
the ground that these statutes are intended to cover all oral representations
regardless of the presence of fraudulent intent. 7 Others allow the relief
on the ground that such statutes are intended to cover only those representations made in good faith.8 Under a New York statute no longer in
effect, brokers' contracts were required to be in writing.9 In a case governed by this statute where the defendant had represented that he had the
authority to sell his wife's property the New York court refused to allow
recovery on the ground that it would be an anomaly to give. "a right of
action for an unauthorized representation

.

.

. of power to make a con-

tract when the breach of the contract would have furnished no ground of
action." "0
The Statute of Frauds is a."provision for excluding in certain cases
such modes of proof as experience had shown to be peculiarly liable to corruption." 11 The purpose of the extension to the field of brokers' contracts
has been to prevent frauds and perjuries, to protect brokers against vendor
ingratitude by encouraging the making of a written memorandum to protect
owners from unfounded claims, and to prevent a flood of litigation from
genuine misunderstandings. 12 To obtain relief upon remand the plaintiff in
the instant case will not be required to prove the elements of a contract, but
rather, that in reliance on the misrepresentation he rendered the requested
services.'2 Thus, the defendant's shield of the Statute of Frauds will not
be infringed upon, and, further, the plaintiff must sustain a high degree
6. 9 Geo. IV, c. 14 § 6 (1828).
7. Baron v. Lange, 92 Cal. App. 2d 718, 207 P.2d 611 (1949); Carr v. Tatum,
133 Cal. App. 274, 24 P.2d 195 (1933); Knight v. Rawlings, 205 Mo. 412, 104 S.W.
38 (1907).
8. Coulter v. Clark, 160 Ind. 311, 66 N.E. 739 (1903) ; Vertrees v. Head & Matthews, 138 Ky. 83, 127 S.W. 523 (1910) ; Bush v. Sprague, 51 Mich. 41, 16 N.W. 222
(1883).
9. New York Sess. Laws 1901, c. 128 (repealed).
In
10. Bloodgood v. Short, 50 Misc. 286, 98 N.Y. Supp. 775, 777 (1906).
BLACK, RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION § 19 (2nd ed. 1929) the author, in speaking
of the language that is used by the court in the cited case in which the term warranty
of authority is used, states that "[A] warranty rests upon contract, while fraud or
fraudulent representations have no element of contract in them, but are essentially
a tort." He also quoted from Rose v. Hurley, 39 Ind. 77 (1872) in which it is stated
that ". . . [T]o speak of a false representation as a contract of warranty, or as tending to prove a contract of warranty is a perversion of language and of correct ideas."

See also Jaynes v. Petoskey, 309 Mich. 32, 144 N.W.2d 566 (1944).
11. BROWNE, STATUTE op FRAUDS, IX (1857) ; 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 275 (1950).
12. Gifford v. Straub, 172 Wis. 396, 179 N.W. 600 (1920).
13. Chavat v. Gildemeister, 222 Mich. 286, 192 N.W. 600 (1920).
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of proof in establishing the tortious misrepresentation. 14 He must also
establish that the "misrepresentation was a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which result[ed] in his loss." 15 The difficulty in
establishing this latter element is pointed up by the fact that, had there
been a writing, the inability of the defendant to convey good title would
have been immaterial to an action on the contract.
Paul W. Callahan

TORTS-RIGHT

OF PRIVACY-ExISTENCE OF THE RIGHT IN PENNSYL-

VANIA-ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL.

Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co. (Pa. 1956).
The plaintiffs, three policemen, had their picture taken in 1945 by
a newspaper photographer as they were holding a robbery suspect whom
they had captured. The picture was published in a newspaper the following
day. In 1948 the defendant purchased the photograph from a news agency
and, without having obtained the plaintiffs' consent, caused it to be published
in a nationally circulated magazine. Four years later the plaintiffs commenced this action for the wrongful invasion of their right of privacy. After
a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, the trial judge entered judgment n.o.v. for
the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the
statute of limitations. The superior court affirmed, holding that an invasion of privacy is a wrong against the person and, therefore, controlled by
the two year statute of limitations.' In so doing, it assumed the existence
of the right of privacy in Pennsylvania. However, the superior court
also indicated that ". .. the doing of an official act does not seem to be
the type of thing which the right of privacy was meant to protect." Hull
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).2
In an early Pennsylvania case, Owen v. Henman, it was said concerning the right of privacy, "The injury, moreover, is not of a temporal
nature: it is altogether of a spiritual character for which no action at law
lies." - But since then, the growth and development of the means of
communication has contributed to the need for the law to recognize the
14. See PROSSER, TORTS § 86 (2d ed. 1955).
15. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 546 (1938).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (Supp. 1956).
2. Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644, 651 (1956).
3. 1 Watts & S.548, 37 Am. Dec. 481 (1841). The action was for damages caused
by defendant's alleged tortious interference with the plaintiff's right to hear and devote his attention to a religious sermon and ceremony.
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right of privacy and afford relief for the more flagrant interferences
with one's personal affairs. 4 Finding impetus in the famous article by
Warren and Brandeis,5 the right of privacy has been established in many
states by judicial decision,e beginning with Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 7 and in others by legislation.8 The opportunity to make a definitive
statement on the existence of the right of privacy has arisen only once, prior
to this case, in an appellate court of Pennsylvania. This was in the case of
Schnabel v. Meredith,9 and there the court said:
"Assuming, without deciding, that such a right does exist in
Pennsylvania, the appellant has not brought himself within the operation of the rules governing the right of privacy where such right has
been judicially recognized." 10
Previous to the Schnabel case, Justice Maxey, in a concurring opinion, in
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co.," said that it was the plaintiff's personal right of privacy, rather than a mere right of property, which permitted
him to enjoin the unauthorized use of his musical arrangements. A
common pleas court has awarded an injunction restraining a physician
from using a photograph of the distorted face of one of his patients in his
class room instruction because of the patient's right of privacy." Two
other common pleas cases have recognized the existence of the right of
privacy in Pennsylvania, but denied damages because the plaintiff had not
brought himself within the rules of recovery. 13 Further, by the Uniform
4. "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest

in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable
to the others." RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 867 (1939).
5. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
6. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Eick v. Perk Dog
Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952) ; State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall,
224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946) ; Itykovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499
(1905) ; Pallas v. Crowley Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948);
Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N.J.Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907) ; Housh
v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956). The right has been rejected in Henry v. Cherry
& Webb. 30 R.I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (1909) ; Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co.,
249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 75 N.W.2d 925 (Wis.
1956).
7. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
8. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1941) ; GA. CODE § 26-2105 (1933) ; N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW

§§ 50,

51; S.C. CODE

VA. CODE ANN.

§

16-81 (1952) ; UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-4-7

to

76-4-9

(1953)

§ 8-650 (1950).

9. 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860 (1954).
10. Id. at 863.

11. 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
12. Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (C.P. Phila. 1940).
13. Lisowski v. Jackiewicz, 76 Pa. D. & C. 79 (C.P. Phila. 1951) (holding that
the directing of insults at the plaintiff in public is not a volation of his right of privacy) ; Harlow v. Buno Co., 36 Pa. D. & C. 101 (C.P. Phila. 1939) (denied damages
because defendant reasonably believed plaintiff had given her consent) ; contra, Barber
v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
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Single Publication Act, 14 "the legislature did not create the right of privacy
in Pennsylvania, but it did recognize the existence of such right." 15 The
federal courts, in applying Pennsylvania law, have held that the right
7
exists."' Where the right is recognized it may be waived by consent.'
The right is also subject to privileged invasions by the press to inform
the public of matters which are of legitimate public interest.' 8 A "public
personage" may lose his right of privacy through a hybridization of consent
and privilege.' 9
While the plaintiffs in this case claim they did not actually consent to
the defendant's publication of their photograph, it seems clear that by virtue
of their position as public officials performing an official act when the
picture was taken, they not only impliedly consented, but were subject to
the defendant's privileged use of it. Yet the question of whether the right
of privacy exists in Pennsylvania remains unanswered, because the court
in the instant case had to go no further than to decide which statute of
limitations would be applicable if it does exist. However, it seems safe
to predict that given an appropriate situation, Pennsylvania will follow the
decided trend of authority and expressly proclaim the existence of the right
of privacy in Pennsylvania.
Edward G. Mekel

TORTS-SURVIVAL STATUTE-CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OF SOLE HEIR.

Fisher v. Dye (Pa. 1956).
In an action for personal injuries and property damage sustained in an
automobile collision, the defendant prosecuted a cross action under a
survival statute (embraced within the Pennsylvania Fiduciaries Act of
14. "No person shall have more than one cause of actioil for damages for libel

or slander, or invasion of privacy, or any other tort founded upon any single publica-

tion, or exhibition, or utterance.
... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2090.1 (Supp. 1956).
15. Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644, 648 (1956).
16. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1956)
Thompson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 193 F.2d 953 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; Leverton v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3rd Cir. 1951); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 132 F.
Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
17. Marek v. Zanol Products Co., 298 Mass. 1, 9 N.E.2d 393 (1937). See Warren
and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 218 (1890).
18. Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 229 F.2d 974 (3rd Cir. 1951); Smith
v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 120 (1948). See also Ragland, The Right of Privacy,

17 Ky. L.J. 85 (1929).
19. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Stryker v. Republic
Picture Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).
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1949) 1 as administrator of the estate of his wife who was killed in the
collision. In this cross action the trial judge instructed the jury that the
husband as administrator of his wife's estate could not recover if he was
contributorily negligent and, at the time of the decedent's death, she had
no creditors and her husband was her sole heir. A verdict against the
husband-administrator was rendered in the cross action. Subsequently,
however, the court en banc concluded that the instruction given was erroneous, and, therefore, granted the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the contributory negligence of the
administrator would not preclude recovery in the estate's action under the
survival statute, though he be the sole heir and the estate free of creditors.
Fisher v. Dye, 125 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1956).2
In an action brought under many wrongful death statutes the contributory negligence of a beneficiary will serve as a complete or partial
bar to recovery. In the majority of such jurisdictions, the negligence of
the sole beneficiary is a complete bar to an action, though the negligence
of another is also a proximate cause of the decedent's death.3 Where
there are several beneficiaries and less than all have been negligent, recovery will be reduced by the amount of the negligent beneficiary's or
beneficiaries' share in an otherwise unreduced recovery. 4 . The principle
underlying such a result is that while no one may profit by his own wrong,
those innocent of such wrong should not be prejudiced thereby. 5 But,
under a survival statute, it is the estate which prosecutes the decedent's
surviving cause of action.6 Therefore, the negligence of an heir or distributee does not preclude recovery, 7 though the contributorily negligent
party be sole heir of the estate.3 Where, under the terms of the survival
statute, a cause of action is extended to named beneficiaries rather than to
the estate, recovery is denied a negligent beneficiary suing as administrator.9
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,

§

320.601 (Supp. 1956).

2. Fisher v. Dye, 125 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1956).
3. Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555 (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1947);
Pike v. Adams, 99 N.H. 221, 108 A.2d 55 (1954) ; Reber v. Hanson, 260 Wis. 632, 51
N.W.2d 505 (1952).
4. Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555 (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1947);
Bays v. Cox Adm'r., 312 Ky. 827, 229 S.W.2d 737 (1950) ; Humphreys v. Ash, 90
N.H. 223, 6 A.2d 436 (1939).
5. Lee v. New River & P. Consol. Coal Co., 203 Fed. 644 (4th Cir. 1913) ; Flaggstaff v. Gomez, 23 Ariz. 184, 202 Pac. 401 (1921) ; Davis v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.,
136 N.C. 115, 48 S.E. 591 (1904).
6. PROSSER, TORTS 705 (2d ed. 1955).
7. Wilmot v. McPadden, 78 Conn. 276, 61 Atl. 1069 (1905) ; Love v. Detroit
J. & C. Ry., 170 Mich. 1, 135 N.W. 963 (1912) ; Potter v. Potter, 224 Wis. 251, 272
N.W. 34 (1937).
8. Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555 (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1947);
Stockton v. Baker, 213 Ark. 918, 213 S.W.2d 896 (1948) ; Love v. Detroit J. & C. Ry.,
170 Mich. 1, 135 N.W. 963 (1912). The opposite result has been reached in New
Hampshire, the court considering the sole heir and not the estate as the real party
in interest. Niemi v. Boston & M. R.R., 87 N.H. 1, 173 Atl. 361 (1934).
9. Crevelli v. Chicago M. & St. P. R.R., 98 Wash. 42, 167 Pac. 66 (1917).
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Theoretically, the instant case is sound since the estate, and not the
heir, is the party on whose behalf the suit is brought. Nevertheless, where
the only heir of an estate having no creditors has contributed to the death
of the decedent the circumstances argue for a different holding. An
analogous situation was presented in the case of Moore, Adin'x v. Prudential
Insurance Co., 10 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy could recover thereon though she
had been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter of the insured. The
Pennsylvania legislature responded with the Slayers Act " which provides
that proceeds of the insurance policy in such a case shall be paid to the
estate of the decedent. Many states have passed statutes divesting "unworthy heirs," usually murderers, of their right to inherit the decedent's
property.' 2 It would seem that an ultimate solution to the problem presented by the instant case would be best effected by an amendment to the
Decedent's Estate Laws of Pennsylvania which would prevent any heir
from sharing in any distributions arising out of funds payable to the estate
from a claim resulting, at least in part, from his own negligence. However, the court here considered this problem to have been prematurely
raised since there had been no final determination by the orphans' court that
the plaintiff was the sole heir and that there were no creditors of the estate.
Burchard V. Martin
10. 342 Pa. 570, 21 A.2d 42 (1941).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 3451 (Supp. 1956).
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.87 (Supp. 1954); OKLA.
(Supp. 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 3443 (Supp. 1956).
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